DTR 3574

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#### YEAR OF CHANGE

#### I. INTRODUCTION

From its origin in 1951 to the end of December 1964, the JOT Program inducted 1,185 trainees of whom 822 were still on duty in the Agency 31 December 1964. During these 14 years, the role that the JOTP has occupied in the Agency's total effort to supply its professional staffing requirements has undergone several significant changes.

The first of these, a major change, took place soon after the Program began - when it veered away from its original purpose of "seeding" the Agency with a few gifted young careerists distributed throughout the Organization and became, instead, primarily a source of case officers for DD/P, with most of the remaining graduates going to 3 of the DD/I Offices. Subsequent changes in the size of the Program developed as a result of growing pressure - notably in 1957, 1960, and 1963 - to expand output, especially to DD/I and DD/S. But it was not until March 1964 (after earlier attempts along the same line in 1960 had foundered) that the Program was actually recast again. The latter change restored the all-Agency orientation of the JOTP and at the same time enlarged its purpose, making it the mechanism through which CIA expects to induct most of its junior professionals.

Some perspective regarding these changes can be gained from the following table showing the number of trainees brought into the Program each year since 1951 and the number remaining from each group:

	ENTER	ED ON DUTY	ON DUTY 31 DECEMBER 1964		
YEAR	ANNUAL NUMBER	CUMULATIVE TOTAL	REMAINING	<del></del>	ULATIVE
	MOPIDEA	TOTAL	FROM CLASS	TOTAL	PERCENTAGE
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956	41 63 48 46 45 80	41 104 152 198 243 323	14 25 18 18 20 49	14 39 57 75 95 144	34.1% 37.5% 37.5% 37.9% 39.1% 44.6%
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964	96 74 79 54 89 96 158 216	419 493 572 626 715 811 969	43 55 62 40 64 77 134 203	187 242 304 344 408 485 619 822	44.6% 49.1% 53.1% 55.0% 57.1% 59.8%
TOTALS	1,185		822*	. OZZ	69.4%

<sup>\*</sup> Figure does not include 8 trainees separated for military service.

NOTE: Annual totals reflect year that JOT's began training and not necessarily year they first entered CIA, except that 1964 total

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Of still greater interest, however, are the following statistics showing the distribution of JOT "graduates" and the proportion which they represent of all employees GS-9 and above in the Career Service Groups (as of 31 December 1964). For it is from these figures that one can best judge the impact of the JOT Program on CIA's total "professional" staff and thus understand a little better some of the concern of those who pushed for the Program's expansion.

CAREER SERVICE GROUP	TOTAL STRENGTH GS-9 & ABOVE	JOT "GRADUATES"	% of jot's
DCI DD/S&T DD/S* DD/I DD/P			
TOTALS			

- \* DD/S strength figures do not include Office of Communications.
- \*\* In addition to 609 "graduates," 213 trainees were still assigned to JOTP 31 December 1964, making a total of 822 on duty.

## II. FY '64 - YEAR OF DECISION

During the early part of FY '64, the Office of Personnel conducted a series of statistical studies examining the size, composition, and certain other characteristics of CIA's professional staff, including: its age distribution; cur sources of new professionals; and the extent to which "professional" positions throughout the Agency were encumbered by employees who had not yet attained "professional" rank.

The studies pointed up, among other things, that for some years CIA had been hiring far too few young officers to meet its professional staffing requirements and had been compensating for this by "over recruiting" clerical and other junior employees, many of whom encumbered lower graded "professional" slots but never reached full productivity at the professional level. As a result, the Agency had developed a sizeable deficit of qualified professional officers, particularly at the junior levels; it had brought about a potentially serious imbalance in the

Lacking more discrete data with which to associate the term "professional," past personnel studies have simply applied it to designated grade levels - usually, in statistical presentations, to GS-9 and above. A classification project nearing completion sorts all CIA positions and personnel into 3 categories - Professional, Technical, and Clerical - and attaches these labels to job titles on the basis of actual duties, not grade. Thus, future studies can employ the terms more precisely. Meanwhile, in this paper when "professional" appears in quotes, it refers to positions and people GS-9 and above; without quotes, its more general meaning is intended.

Pending a more complete assessment of the Agency's staffing program, the personnel studies called for an immediate increase in young officers and urged that they be inducted through the JOT Program. This led to a formal proposal supported by the Deputy Directors to establish, beginning with FY '65, an annual recruitment objective of 225 JOT's with specified quotas for each Directorate. The proposal was approved 5 March 1964, along with the necessary ceiling and budget authorizations to implement it.

### III. FY '65 - YEAR OF CHANGE

Faced with a firm objective to induct 225 trainees in FY '65 and years to follow, the JOT Staff, supported by OTR and Personnel, set in motion in March 1964 the operating plan it had developed for this purpose. The plan visualized 2 new JOT classes (of 35-40 trainees each) to be held in October and April to supplement the regular classes (of 70-75 each) held every July and January. It contemplated a course of specialized instruction for DD/S trainees comparable to that given DD/P and DD/I trainees. It required staff adjustments in JOTP and OTR to handle the new work load. And all the selection, assignment, and other managerial machinery for the greatly augmented Program had to be put in shape.

Not to be overlooked in all these important changes was the name of the Program itself, for in March 1965 it too fell under the spell of change and became the <u>Career Training Program</u>, thus symbolizing the <u>complete</u> break between the old order and the new.

How has the Career Training Staff handled its objectives in this year of change? Very well indeed, we believe. Some imbalances in filling Directorate quotas can be noted, but these were not unexpected during the first year. The important thing was to hit the overall target and that has been done - almost on the button. The 4 classes contained respectively 75, 35, 76, and 32 trainees for a yearly total of 218. So for the first time it appears we can now accurately predict the number of trainees this Program is going to produce each year.

To summarize performance, here's the record:

	PROJECT ASSIGNME	FY 165 TRAINEE QUOTA	CAREER SERVICE GROUP
(undesignated)	5 44 55 105 <b>3</b>	10 65 55 90	DCI DD/S&T DD/S DD/I DD/P
	218	220*	TOTALS

<sup>\* 225</sup> recruitment objective includes attrition allowance of 5.

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#### A. <u>FY '66</u>

As the tables and charts in the next section indicate, CIA still has a long way to go in strengthening its situation with respect to young officers at the lower and intermediate levels. But at least the corner has been turned and trend lines are moving in the right direction.

Comparisons of the age distribution of GS-9's and above at the end of 1964 with the picture 2 years earlier (TABS A, B, and C) show the beginnings of an encouraging build-up in the numbers of young "professionals" under 30 years of age.

Also, the wide gap that existed a year and a half ago between the Agency's on-duty strength in grades GS-9 and above and total positions authorized in those grades has begun to close - so that by 31 December 1964 the earlier (31 October 1963) differential of 1,533 had shrunk to a more manageable 967 (TAB D) and is continuing to contract at a fairly good pace. Of course, not all of this shrinkage has been due to the hiring of more young officers. 178 positions GS-9 and above were abolished last year when the Agency cut its ceiling. And some of the 388 net additions to "professional" strength included clerical and technical employees "crossing over" to professional jobs (72 did so during 1964), sometimes without being required to show "full credentials." But a good, healthy share of the improvement has been caused by inducting greater numbers of young officers and that, of course, is what we need and want.

Now what about FY '66? Should the annual recruitment objective of 225 Career Trainees established in March 1964 be continued? Or should it be raised so that it will approximate somewhat more closely the Agency's total need for young officers during the coming year?

Continuation of the 225 objective is the answer proposed for FY '66 for at least 3 reasons:

- 1. In the first place, although significant improvements are being made in the Agency's manpower planning machinery, we have not yet reached the point where long-range forecasts of professional staffing requirements can be made with the precision believed necessary for translating them into specific CTP quotas. From the data at hand, it is perfectly clear that 225 Career Trainees a year can easily be justified, and strong evidence suggests a somewhat higher figure, particularly in light of rising trends expected in the loss rate of Agency professionals. However, until long-range forecasts can be focused on these trends more sharply than at present, it seems prudent to stick with our established objective.
- 2. Secondly, last year's sharp increases in trainees presented both OTR and the Career Training Staff with some formidable

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management problems, not all of which have been completely mastered as yet. Another year at the 225 level would no doubt afford both components a welcome "breather" before they are asked to step up the pace still more. DD/S, too, can profitably use more time to adjust to the new situation and to complete its plans for absorbing relatively large numbers of trainees from the expanded program.

3. Finally, and most persuasive of all, the major components in a recent poll reflected the desire to hold at the 225 level for at least another year. The FY '66 CTP requirements which they have submitted are shown below, alongside their FY '65 requirements:

CAREER SERVICE GROUP	FY '65 JOT REQUIREMENTS	FY '66 CT REQUIREMENTS
DCI DD/S&T DD/S DD/P DD/I O-DD/I	10 65 90 55 (1)	5 10 55 90 55
OBI OCI OCR ONE ORB Contact NPIC	(2) (12) (10) (1) (20) (3) (4) (2)	(2) (18) (4) (2) (23) (2)
Allowance for Attrition	5	10
TOTALS	225	225

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### B. THE YEARS BEYOND

Accompanying the March 1964 staff paper that proposed increasing the JOT Program to 225 a year were a number of charts and tables depicting CIA's urgent need for more young officers. Since these TABS provided the basis for many of the key contentions that appeared in the paper, they are pertinent to our present look at "the years beyond '66." Consequently, the 4 most significant TABS have been updated to 31 December 1964 and are attached. The first 3 deal with the age distribution of CIA's "professionals," the fourth with the adequacy of their numbers.

TAB A - Age Distribution of GS-9 thru GS-18 Staff Personnel
By Year of Age - As of 31 December '62 and 31 December '64

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- TAB B Changes in Age Composition of Personnel COMEDENTIAL
- TAB C Comparison of Junior Professional Personnel (GS-9 and Above Under Age 30) 1958-1964
- TAB D Position and Personnel Strength by Career Service Grade Groups GS-9 and Above and GS-8 and Below - 31 December '64

TAB A depicting the familiar "age hump" among CIA "professionals" shows good improvement during 1963 and '64 in our position with respect to young officers. TABS B and C echo this development, portraying it in different ways. TAB B, for instance, shows how the proportion of officers under age 35 in the middle grades 9 through 12 declined steadily through the 6 years preceding FY '64, then reversed, and in the 2 years between 30 June '63 and 30 June '65 will improve more than 25%. TAB C highlights trends in the key age group under 30, the group that most directly reflects our long-range staffing intentions and practices.

At the same time that TAB A is reflecting improvement in our acquisition of young officers, however, it is also displaying some less pleasant signs. One tells us that, despite the appearance of more officers under 30 during the past two years, the average age of our "professional" staff has continued to rise (and now stands at more than 41). Another shows how the already serious "hump" has been accentuated even more by net additions (largely through promotions to GS-9) in the critical 38-43 year age bracket that forms the crest of the "hump." Thus, while TAB A provides some reasons for encouragement, it allows none for complacency.

TAB D is essentially a double entry ledger - one entry recording the Agency's established requirements for "professionals," the other, its assets. Requirements reflect approved T/O positions GS-9 and above; assets represent staff personnel GS-9 and above. As was indicated earlier, this ledger showed a "deficit" of 967 "professionals" as of 31 December 1964 - down considerably from the 1,533 figure of 14 months earlier, but uncomfortably high nevertheless.

It should be pointed out that a certain amount of "deficit" staffing is normal with CIA's professionals, especially when due to filling staff slots with military and contract personnel - totaling perhaps 100 or so at any time - or with junior professionals for whom "headroom" is being reserved. The "deficit" becomes a matter of real concern therefore only when it arises from vacant professional positions and from those "encumbered" by clerical or other junior employees lacking professional qualifications. Knowing this, one might ask: how much "deficit" represents a normal or acceptable level? An exact figure cannot be given, of course, but a rough estimate of 400-600 is probably fair, as the picture appears in TAB D. Later, when two moves now underway are completed, it should be possible to make such an estimate with much more confidence.

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The first of these moves, as indicated earlier, is to identify professional positions and people by duties rather than grade; the second is to provide better means for evaluating the professional qualifications and potential of junior personnel.

At least one more ingredient must be added in any discussion of long-range staffing plans - anticipated attrition. At present, losses among professionals (including those hired as junior professionals below GS-9) are running about 500-525 a year. This rate can be expected to remain fairly steady through FY '69, expanding only slightly each year. By FY '70 though, we can expect an ascent in the rate which by '73 or '74 will carry it to levels much higher than CIA has ever experienced before. One of the major planning tasks ahead of us is to plot the course of our attrition far enough in advance to enable Career Services to take the necessary measures to deal with it.

To summarize - FY '64 and '65 have brought several healthy changes in CIA's professional staffing program; others are in prospect. Much remains to be done, but the key trend lines now point in the right direction.

As a final note, perhaps it's fair to ask where these trend lines should lead and what goals we seek. As long-range targets, these are suggested:

- a fully staffed professional complement (with a vacancy rate never higher than 2-3%) all of whose members met reasonable induction standards;
- a carefully controlled age distribution among professionals which, when charted, reflects a stable profile whose crest spans the 25-35 age bracket -- and an average age for all professionals stabilized somewhere near 40;
- manpower planning machinery calibrated to achieve and maintain the foregoing situation, and an Agency with the resolve to use such machinery.

To translate these targets into long-range annual recruitment objectives for the Career Training Program, we need an equation based on both requirements and policy. The first, which has to do with ceiling, attrition, etc., is susceptible to statistical projection. But the second can only be presumed - meaning in this case the ratio of professional requirements we intend, as a matter of policy, to satisfy through the CTP instead of other means such as internal promotions or "lateral" recruitment. Even so, if we conclude that our present policy of offsetting at least 40% of anticipated professional losses with CTP recruits will continue for the next several years, then it is reasonably clear that we can look forward to a rise soon in the annual recruitment objective to about the 275-300 level.

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